Arab Spring and the current world order: A Multifaceted Examination of Politics, Foreign Policy, and Ideology

 

1. Introduction

On December 7, 2024, Syrians were finally free of Bashar Al-Assad's five-decade-long totalitarian dictatorship and 13 years of civil war. This transition comes at a critical time in the expanding Israel-Palestine conflict, with Israel entering the Syrian border for the first time in 50 years as the rebel group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seizes control of Syria. This move, while may have come as a relief from one Tyrant for the Syrians, might also signal the commencement of another interstate battle with Israel, returning the populace to the tragedies of war.

The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt inspired Syrians to demand political reform, greater freedoms, and an end to corruption. Most of the scholars studying the Arab Spring tend to reduce its roots to socio- economic problems. While this argument holds substantive evidence, the prolonged effect of this revolutionary uprising has been polluted by geopolitics of the region and not just internal state politics. 

The present complexities are commonly directed at the Arab Spring, from which the Middle East is still striving to recover and the West is still hoping to find a way to turn it into a democracy that votes in its favour on a global scale. However, there is now a need to examine all of the events that have occurred since the conversion of these tribe-based territories into an unplanned boundary, not in pieces, but as a comprehensive jigsaw involving the people, governments of the Middle East, and other states.

This paper examines the Arab Spring's impact on the Middle East, focusing on its geopolitical, social, and pre- Spring events. The paper critically evaluates Western narratives and non-Western perspectives, aiming to bridge the gap between Western and indigenous narratives, highlighting the multidimensional and enduring impact of the Arab Spring.

2. Foreign Policy of US and Russia Towards the Middle East 

2.1 United States

The West's policy towards the Middle East may be examined through two lenses: first, the U.S.A's interest in the Middle East to retain its hegemony and control of oil resources, and second, its approach to other countries in the region to balance Israel's interest. This paper will focus on the second approach. 

The U.S.A led several military missions in the Middle East since the mid-20th century, the United States has led several military missions in the Middle East, focusing on regional stability, counterterrorism, and geopolitical interests. Notable interventions include the Lebanon Crisis (1958), Gulf War (1990-1991), Iraq War (2003-2011), Counter-ISIS Campaign (2014-present), Syrian Civil War (2011-present), and Yemen and Counterterrorism Operations (2002-present). These missions have been aimed at achieving regional defeats for ISIS, influencing the outcome of the Syrian conflict, and targeting Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

However, U.S. foreign policy has not been limited solely to military intervention; it has also involved the promotion of democracy in the region. In 2003, in the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush launched the 'Freedom Agenda,' renouncing sixty years of 'excusing and accommodating' in the Middle East. The administration emphasized that democracy promotion was in the American national interest and spent hundreds of millions towards this goal. Yet, these policies were often aimed more at cultivating regional allies to support the war on terror than at genuinely fostering democratic reform in the East.

During the "war on terror," the United States expanded relationships with Middle Eastern Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states, as well as their authoritarian governments, to share intelligence, cooperate militarily, and provide logistical support (Bolan, 2021). The United States created military bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, which were critical to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States collaborated closely with Arab intelligence services to battle terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, frequently using questionable tactics. The United States gave economic and military aid to Arab allies in order to strengthen their security and sustain their economy. Despite these strategic alliances, the United States has faced criticism for assisting authoritarian regimes accused of human rights violations, till this day (Carothers Feldman,2023).

However, this approach faced a major challenge with the Arab Spring that look, several authoritarian regimes in its flames.  This called for more of a pragmatic approach and not all size fits all. One of the major losses that the U.S would have faced if the Arab Spring had been successful, was the installment of democratic governments who would have denied the State of Israel and opposed U.S interest. Under the war of terror, Washington had already established relationships with the regimes. Despite the relations U.S led NATO intervened in Libya during the uprising but its stand on other countries were not the same. Further, the US decision to help push Mubarak out of office angered Saudi leadership, who believed the US was abetting a long-time ally (Fontaine, 2011). Saudi Arabia has provided oil at the US's request, and US actions could weaken this partnership. This was also seen as the one of the reasons that made the U.S take a more toned down approach on Bahrain (Stark, 2020). Interestingly, out of all the Arab countries, Libya had the more staunched stand on Israel. The Libyan leader financed the Palestinian struggle and hosted Palestinian militants and was vocal about his criticism of the USA and Israel in his interviews.  However, this won’t be the first time the U.S targeted countries with leadership with a rigid stand on Israel, the same way was suffered by Saddam Hussien. During the Gulf War (1990–91),he attempted to rally Arab support by framing his conflict with the U.S.-led coalition as a broader struggle against Israel and Western imperialism. 

Overall, the Arab Spring represented a significant challenge to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as long-standing authoritarian allies faced popular unrest and potential collapse. The threat was also significant to the U.S.'s closest ally Israel, who feared the emergence of new regimes hostile to its interests. The fear stemmed from the unknown stand of the new government. Israel preferred the status quo where they had worked with authoritarian regimes who shared common enemies like Iran, so the US had to balance its relations keeping in mind the Israeli interest

(Hove & Mutanda, 2014; Pressman, 2014). However, the new Brotherhood government, if elected democratically would have had to represent public sentiments, which as per Pew poll taken after Mubarak’s fall found that Egyptians favoured annulling the peace treaty with Israel by a 54 per cent to 36 percent margin (Alibonï, 2011; Byman, 2013).

Israel, as the sole non-Arab nation in the Arabian Peninsula, has been a strategic ally of the United States since its inception. This alliance serves as a strategic tool for Washington to counter the rising tide of Arab nationalism, which demonstrated its potency through the imposition of oil embargoes (Historical Documents, 2012). Consequently, the US has acted to safeguard Israel's security and regional dominance through arms transfers, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support, which has only increased over time. Meanwhile, this favouritism of the US was seen as an opportunity for the USSR, to turn the Arab world towards its sphere of influence.

2.3 The Arab Spring as an opportunity for Russia

Reminiscent of the cold war period, between the US and Russia, it further found its space in the Middle East. The Arab Spring provided an opportunity for Russia to regain its influence in the region. Russia supported regimes that were being challenged during the Arab Spring, such as Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria, to solidify its influence in the Middle East and advance its strategic interests in the region (Beres et al., 2004; Alibonï, 2011;Byman, 2013).One of the key qualities that Russia has, which makes it an attractive ally, is its clear stance on allowing countries to rule themselves.

Russia’d foreign policy at certain levels carry forward the USSR legacy. The country shares historical ties with Syria since the Cold War era. Russia’s continued support to the country can be attributed to its strategic location. Compared to the U.S who imports oil, Russia is a producer of oil in itself hence, its presence in the region isn’t limited to oil rich resources of the Arab Peninsula. Arms trade acts as a backbone of the Russian economy; it is among the five largest exporters of Arms, after the US and  France followed by  China and Germany, all together accounted for 75 per cent of all arms exports (Wezeman et al., 2023). 

Countering the influence of America in the region is one important aspect of Russia, another is the trade route. Region’s geographic location makes it an essential crossroads for global trade. Important marine chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal, make it easier to transport commodities between important international markets (Global Affairs Explained, 2022). So, the countries influencing the region will be able to dictate the marine trade but also control the Mediterranean sea. Supporting its long historical allies allows Russia to flex its military muscle and deter total Western influence. Second, Russia is actively working to regain its position as the preferred arms supplier for Arab nations (Sladden et al., 2017). Russia had an opportunity to expand its arms trade because of the regional unrest that intensified with the Arab Spring.

The last and important perspective is the ideological tug of war. In contrast to the US, Russia opposes capitalism and the market system. The Russian market is heavily regulated by the government. Constant resistance to capitalist market space regulated by private actors and influenced by west works against the favour for Moscow. The Middle East despite several attempts has not been democratised or has fallen in complete trap of capitalist approach, rather the authoritarian regimes control the resources. This prevents Russia from geopolitical isolation and sanctions which otherwise can be put by the US and its western allies. Russia's relations with the West are already deteriorating at the moment due to its war in Ukraine. The nation's economic progress has been hampered by the severing of ties and growing isolation in the global arena, which has prevented it from accessing important markets (German and Kuhrt, 2023). 

However, with the fall of Assad's reign and takeover by the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS),  a resistant group fighting against Assad and Russia, Moscow will have to reassess its goal, as it has widely supported an oppressive regime. 

3. Battle of Ideology

Looking at the Middle East as the ground for ideological struggle is an important perspective. However, the battle is two facets, the ideologies ingrained within the wider Arab society and the competing ideologies of superpowers.

The ideologies that have been at loggerhead in the Middle East include, Islamist/Salafist ideology, Arab nationalism, Western liberal democracy, and the authoritarian model (Din, 2021. With the events of the Arab Spring, the ideological struggle intensified. Despite the already existing ideologies studied by earlier scholars, it is also important to note that the Arabian Peninsula has its own rich history which shapes the opinion of different groups in the region as well as the masses. Western and European power, in particular, fails to understand this setting via the constructivist lens, which focuses on how ideas, norms, and identities affect state behaviour and influence international results. The persistent orientalist attitude to the region has further exacerbated the geopolitical consequences; it is critical to recognise that the region is not an anarchic society that can be civilised through orientalist approaches. 

The Arab society is a cluster of several tribes where affiliation and loyalty of each individual lies to each respective tribe. Tribal identity and loyalty have been an essential factor, shaping the political and social fabric of the region (Spindel, 2011). Secondly, it is the birthplace of Islam, which has become an integral part of Arab identity. The U.S and Russia have time and again tried to export their ideas of Democracy and Marxism respectively, however both are in contradiction to the Arab strategic culture.

The strategic culture of Arab societies differs significantly from the Western liberal democratic and communist models. It does not align with the Westphalian conception of the nation-state. While the Westphalian model is widely accepted globally due to its perceived value, the underlying principles of this framework originate from a European-centric perspective that may not resonate with the region's historical and cultural context.

The Arabian civilization roots back thousands of years, pre-dating the U.S and Europe. Despite the failure of Arab nationalism in uniting the Arab world, the idea of Arab unity and flag bearer of the one major religion of the world identity remains strong. The tribal culture among Arabs have also been the root of inter-tribal rivalry that didn’t allow unity among the tribes and the region has been conquered by great powers like Persians and Romans. It was only after Islam that Arabs gained dominance in their own region. Under Political Islam, different tribes didn’t only unite but defeated the superpowers of their times, prior to which they were never seen as competitors by any kingdom, let alone Persians and Romans.

They were later divided into dynasties like the Umayyad and Abbasid, but the underlying factor that gave them the strength to maintain peace for so long was the concept of Political Islam, which was also largely supported by the common people.The people in the region found a way to reconcile their differences by navigating a clear progression of identities: from tribal allegiance to a broader Arab identity, and ultimately to a unifying Muslim identity. Even the Ottoman empire despite being Turks allowed the local tribe leaders to retain their autonomy and played on the ground of Political Islam.

The struggle of the region was different from that of the U.S which was under the rule of a foreign power and then decided on Democracy as a way of governance after independence or Russia, where the idea is based more on a classless society.  The idea of Nation-State itself is the area of struggle, for the Arabian Peninsula. The counties that make up this region have borders that were drawn by colonial powers, which do not necessarily follow the tribal and ethnic affiliations. 

Discovery of oil, further, intensified the quest to control these countries. Thus, the ideological conflict in the Middle East is a complex web of competing identities, cultures, and worldviews, where the struggle for dominance and influence continues to play out. It is important to note that most of the leaders who were the voice of Arab Nationalism lost their grounds prior to the Arab Spring and rest during the uprising. Leaving behind a leadership crisis that could consolidate the Arab world under one identity despite the borders.  

4. Leadership Crisis in the region

The Arab world has long been plagued by a leadership crisis, with many countries in the region struggling to maintain stable and effective governance. The First World War caused a serious ideological split in the area. The British successfully used the genesis of the Pan Arab movement against Ottoman Turkish identity to enlist Arab allies against Germany. However, this undermined existing local power structures and created a political vacuum that Arab leaders have struggled to fill ever since (Jabbra, 1989).

Through Arab identification and the broader Muslim identity of Pan Islamism, the leader has attempted to bring the area together in the past. Pan-Islamist principles have been promoted by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in 1928 (Wagemakers, 2022). A significant portion of the movement's leadership was held by Arab Muslim leaders, despite the fact that Pan Arabism emphasised Arab identity and embraced members of other Arab religious organisations.

Despite the two movements, the region suffers from a great leadership crisis. This leadership crisis also emerges from the paradoxical position that these two movements present. Pan Islamism calls for unity across the Muslim world. However, the Muslim countries themselves struggle to fully identify their stand. For example,  Erdogan's Turkey is a strong supporter of the phrase Ummah but has failed to defend its stance on Kurds. Internally the battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran to control the geopolitics of the region has taken on a new form under the Sunni Shia division. 

In the wake of the Arab Spring, many Arab states collapsed into civil war or descended into political chaos, with the promise of democratic reform giving way to renewed authoritarianism and instability (Afsah, 2017; Aras & Kardaş, 2021). The battles between rival factions and interests have undermined any possibility of effective regional leadership. Iranian leaders believe Saudi Arabia is responsible for integrating an anti-Iran coalition and misrepresenting the threat Tehran's growing might poses to regional security. Also, Iran alleged that while doing so, Riyadh had the backing of Israel and US President Donald Trump (Barzegar, 2022).

Furthermore, militant organisations who are allied to Iran, like Hezbollah, some Hashd al-Shaabi fighters, and the Houthis, have expanded their positions in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, respectively, building strong political systems throughout the Arab world (Kali and Merrow, 2024). Israel and Saudi Arabia have suffered because of this change in the region's power dynamics.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) presence in Yemen to attack Israel is also perceived by its regional rival  Riyadh. It believes that such a foothold would lead to a failed state on the southern border of Saudi Arabia, threatening the trade and security of Gulf Arab states, including by posing a threat from Houthi ballistic missiles (Solomon, 2024). Saudi Arabia for this matter needs to support a revamped cooperative strategy that involves the United States and its regional allies to control Iranian proxies across the Middle East even if that may go against the popular position of the Saudi citizens.

Iran's efforts to expand its influence in the Arab world conflict with the separate regional goals of Saudi Arabia and Israel backed by the US. As noted earlier, the Arab public still supports the Palestinian cause, but the instability caused by the Arab Spring has diminished any causative effect of this support. As per (Awaad, 2020), the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the regional power dynamics has led to a security dilemma in the Middle East, with both countries engaging in a zero-sum game to increase their influence.  This zero sum game doesn’t allow one country to rise as a regional power. Other Arab countries who survived the Arab Spring, despite not being democratic are progressing at a great speed economically. Taking a stand against the U.S or Iran backed by Russia will be an invitation to conflict and destruction to their homeland. 

5. Conclusion

The Arab Spring cannot be viewed solely through the lens of geopolitics and as a singular event. It is also the result of the region's ongoing identity conflict, which was erased when the borders were drawn. The Arab World has been a battle ground since the inception of Israel which led to a series of other events but the Spring brought in internal chaos for each country and civil wars.  Israel gives the US a platform to maintain its sway over the mineral and oil-rich region. This is crucial to prevent future Arab oil embargoes. The region is a crucial zone for Russia to ensure its dominance throughout the Mediterranean and important sea routes like the Suez Canal, considering Russia already suffers because of its competing interests with the Capitalist market space. 

The influence of outer players coupled within the structural abnormalities is what led to the Arab Spring and the aftermath, which saw the rise of terror groups and armed resistance groups. Further, the authoritarian regimes and their control over countries resources left the public with little options leading to the upheaval. However, the emerging groups and factions in the aftermath highlight the fact that disatisfaction stems from the region's complicated colonial legacy as well as its lost strategic culture. Furthermore, the rivalry between the states in the region doesn’t support the rise of one regional power. The absence of adherence to a solid ideological foundation is a defining feature of the current situation in the Arab world. With the fall of the Assad regime in the region and ongoing Israeli Palestinian conflict and US’s support to Israel, the new factions which emerged due to the reverberating effect of Arab Spring, if they come to power like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham are less likely to support the US. Whether or not democracy prevails, the next event is likely to represent the feelings of the people who are stuck in the never-ending cycle of conflict, which has benefited both the US and Russia economically in terms of trade.  

Nevertheless, for the chaos post Arab Spring to come to an end the region needs a unifying idea that can determine the development of the region. It is equally important for the foreign powers that instead of sustaining cycles of intervention and dependency, international organisations and coalitions need to have conversations that recognise the region's distinct identity as well as historical and cultural heritage.

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